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Introduction 
The efficient allocation of capital is an important determinant of long term growth prospects and the 
productive capacity of the economy. In a neoclassical Solow model, it is not only the volume of 
investment that affects growth but also the marginal value product of capital. It is therefore important 
to understand the corporate determinants of capital efficiency. One particular theme in the 
international literature on firm investment efficiency focuses on the effect of ownership, in particular 
state versus private ownership, on firm performance (Shleifer, 1998; La Porta and Lopez de Silanes, 
1999; Ramamurti, 1997). Many of the studies focus on transition countries which moved from socialist 
to market-oriented economic systems (Frydman, Gray, Hessel, and Rapaczynski, 1999; Claessens, 
Djankov, and Pohl, 1997; Claessens, and Djankov, 1999). This research has also informed many of the 
structural reform programmes that are encouraged by the international financial institutions, and can 
become part of the conditionality attached to official assistance.  
Focusing specifically on transition economies in East Asia such as China and Viet Nam, there have been a 
number of studies which highlight that despite successfully following investment intensive growth, the 
efficiency of investment has been poor. This is particularly the case where continued state-owned 
enterprise activity is a considerable share of economic activity and where state owned enterprises 
(SOEs) suffer from weak corporate governance and conflicting policy and return objectives (Dollar & 
Wei, 2007; IMF, 2012; Viet Nam Development Report 2012; OECD, 2013).  
Within this wider context our research considers the effect of ownership on the efficiency of investment 
in Viet Nam. Despite strong economic growth since the onset of original “Doi Moi” reforms, Viet Nam’s 
more recent growth has slowed. While many factors have contributed, one of the areas which continues 
to pose policy challenges is the performance and ongoing reform of the SOE sector (IMF, 2013; OECD, 
2013; VEPR, 2012). SOE restructuring has been a core policy focus of the government and is a key 
element in the 2011-2015 strategic plan. However, despite ongoing restructuring including privatisation 
and equitization programmes, the SOE sector continues to display poor returns to factor inputs (IMF, 
2013; Viet Nam Development Report, 2012). Soft budget constraints, poor corporate governance and 
managerial oversight have led to excessive leverage and poor investment efficiency (IMF, 2013).  
Given this backdrop, our research attempts to 1) test the difference in investment efficiency between 
SOEs and private firms and 2) evaluate the effect of privatisiation and equitisation policies on the 
investment efficiency of former SOEs. The existing literature focuses on the impacts of ownership 
objectives and corporate governance on firm efficiency in transition economies (Meggison and Netter, 
2001; Chen et al., 2011). The research suggests these objectives can differ between SOEs and private 
firms due a number of factors including moral hazard (Meggison and Netter, 2001; Chen et al., 2011) or 
soft budget constraints (Berglof and Roland, 1998; Hersch et al, 1997; Meggison and Netter, 2001; 
Schaffer, 1998).   
Our research builds on the work of Chen et al. (2011) and Dollar and Wei (2007) but is the first study in 
the literature to apply a structural model to an extensive dataset which includes both large firms and 
micro, small and medium-sized firms across manufacturing, services and construction sectors. Our 
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research therefore contributes to the extant literature by applying a structural investment model and 
exploring the heterogeneity of ownership effects on investment efficiency across groups of firms and 
industries. This is facilitated by using the fundamental Q model of investment proposed by Gilchrist and 
Himmelberg (1995) and applied empirically by Bierlen and Featherstone (1998), Ryan et al (2014) and 
O’Toole et al. (2014) to test the difference in investment efficiency between SOEs and non-SOEs. This 
methodology has a number of benefits. As it does not require stock market data it can be estimated on 
non-listed, small and medium-sized enterprises. This facilitates a broader assessment than has been 
conducted to date as close studies (Chen et al., 2007; Chen et al., 2014) only conduct their evaluation on 
stock market-listed enterprises. The focus on SMEs is salient, given their importance in the development 
process and their greater susceptibility to capital market and product market frictions (Beck et al, 2006; 
Beck et al; 2008). We also consider whether differences in investment efficiency exist between firms 
classified as financially constrained or unconstrained.  
We also specifically build on the work of Chen et al. (2014) who test the impact of government and 
foreign ownership on investment efficiency using a world-wide sample of privatised enterprises. While 
not relying on cross-country variation, our research provides greater heterogeneity across enterprises 
than has been possible to date by focusing on a transition economy from East Asian, and applying a the 
Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1995) approach to include listed and non-listed SMEs. Our disaggregation 
across size classes and sectors is also novel. This approach, as it is estimated by generalised method of 
moments techniques, can control for endogeneity, unobserved heterogeneity and measurement error 
simultaneously. Exploring how the impacts of privatization on investment efficiency differ across 
different development contexts is important especially given the findings of Boubakri et al. (2005) who 
note differential outcomes for developing rather than developed economies.  
Our second contribution builds on the literature which evaluates efficiency changes following ownership 
changes through SOE privatisation and equitization, mainly in Eastern European transition economies 
(Claessens, Djankov, and Pohl, 1997; Earle and Telegdy, 2002; Brown et al., 2006a:b). There is a large 
body of evidence which indicates that the privatisation of state-owned firms leads to significant 
improvements in productivity and profitability (Shleifer, 1998). We build on the existing research (La 
Porta and Lopez de Silanes, 1999; Ramamurti, 1997; Djankov and Pohl, 1997; Claessens and Djankov, 
1999) by focusing on an East Asian transition economy and by applying a structural investment model 
for both SMEs and large firms across difference sectors. We also simultaneously test the differential 
effects of full privatisation, equitization with SOE retaining a controlling shareholding (greater than 50 
per cent ownership) and equitization with the state maintaining a minority shareholding (less than 50 
per cent ownership). This provides additional insight and complements the extant literature. By 
including state-owned firms that have not been privatised as a control group we can also address one of 
the sample selection issues mentioned by Chen et al. (2014) in terms of the state selection of which 
enterprises to bring to market. 
A number of findings emerge from our analysis. We find no significant relationship between Q and 
investment for SOEs and a positive and significant effect for private firms. These results suggest no link 
between fundamentals and investment at SOEs; capital input choices are not linked to firm-specific 
marginal returns. The results are broadly in line with Chen et al. (2011) who focused on large Chinese 
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firms and Chen et al. (2014) for a broad cross country sample. In terms of the economic magnitude of 
the effects, a one standard deviation shock to Q leads to a 0.198 unit increase in investment. As the 
mean investment in the sample is 0.38, this implies an investment increase of 50 per cent.  
On the distributional impacts across groups of enterprises, our main findings of significance holds for 
both private firms and SMEs as well as across strategic and non-strategic sectors. . The magnitude of the 
coefficient is smaller for small firms than large firms. Larger enterprises may have better access to 
internal capital and can react more quickly when opportunities arise. It may also be the case that due to 
their size, they are more likely to commit risky capital in particular in uncertain environments. SMEs may 
react with more restraint and be influences by uncertain domestic market developments. The 
coefficient is also larger for larger in the strategic sector relative to the non-strategic sector. If 
competition is stronger in the non-strategic sector, this may drive down returns and make firms more 
uncertain about committing capital. We test whether there are differences in SOEs depending on 
whether they are controlled centrally or locally as in Chen et al. (2011) and find no evidence of 
investment efficiency for either group. We also find financial constrained private enterprises are more 
efficient that unconstrained enterprises. This is unsurprising given such enterprises have higher marginal 
capital products and are operating at sub-optimal capital stock levels. 7 
Using the structural Q model, we also test the effect of privatisation and equitization policies on the 
investment efficiency of former SOEs. We find that fully privatised former SOEs that have been equitized 
with the state only retaining a minority state shareholding have a positive relationship between Q and 
investment suggesting, that full privatisation improves the efficiency in capital allocation. Our findings of 
an improvement in performance following privatisiation are in line with many studies in the existing 
literature (La Porta and Lopez de Silanes, 1999; Ramamurti, 1997). Our findings are also in line with 
exisiting studies that focus on economies in transition such as Claessens, Djankov, and Pohl (1997) who 
document an improvement in tobins’ Q following privatisation in Czech republic. The results are also in 
line with Pohl, Anderson, Claessens, and Djankov (1999) who use a cross-country study and identify the 
improvement to productivity of privatised to non-privatized firms. Frydman, Gray, Hessel, and 
Rapaczynski (1999) test the differing performance of SOEs and private firms for a sample of 90 SOEs and 
128 private firms in Czech republic, Hungary and Poland and find privatisation to an outside owner 
improves productivity by 9 per cent. Our findings indicate that post privatization and equitization, 
reformed firms have a larger sensitivity of investment to Q than private firms which would suggest 
positive efficiency gains following privatisation. These results are also in line with the work of Earle and 
Telegdy (2002) who find positive effects of privatisation on labour productivity in Romania and Brown et 
al. (2006 b) and find a positive effect on domestic firms post privatisation in Hungary, Romania, Russia 
and Ukraine using a multifactor productivity model.  
Testing these effects across groups of firms and industries, the main findings hold for SMEs and firms in 
non-strategic sectors. Differences are evident for large firms and firms in strategic sectors: enterprises 
whose divestment mechanism was either equitization with a majority shareholding or firms who were 
privatised having previously been equitized that display a positive relationship between Q and 
investment for strategic sectors. For large firms, minority shareholding equitization and privatisation 
from previous equitization are the divestment routes through which we find a positive and statistically 
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significant relationship between Q and investment. These findings indicate that there is considerable 
heterogeneity across groups of firms and industries in the impact of state divestment on investment 
efficiency.  
Our findings have a number of important policy implications for Viet Nam in transition. We find that 
SOEs do not appear to link investment to neoclassical determinants of returns. Additionally, we find 
following privatisation and equitization with minority SOE shareholdings does improve the investment 
efficiency of firms. A continued focus on reforming the SOE sector and undertaking managed and 
balanced privatisation and equitizisation policies can contribute to improved investment efficiency. This 
will in turn improve growth outcomes over time.   
The rest of this paper is structured as follows: section 2 presents existing literature, section 3 outlines 
the empirical approach and econometric considerations, section 4 presents the data and summary 
statistics. Section 5 contains the empirical results and section 6 concludes.   
1. Related literature and hypotheses development 
In this section, we use the existing literature to pose a number of testable hypotheses with which to 
investigate using our analytical framework. We present these hypotheses with reference to our specific 
contributions as well as the extant research. Assessing the differences in investment efficiency between 
state-owned enterprises and private firms is well researched topic in the literature (Shleifer and Vishny, 
1997; Dewenter and Malatesta, 2001; Meggison and Netter, 2001; Chen et al., 2011). It is motivated 
theoretically by focusing on differences in objective structures, moral hazard and agency problems that 
lead to a divergence in behavior for SOEs relative to private firms relating to value maximization. In a 
standard neoclassical investment framework, enterprises will investment up to the position whereby the 
marginal benefit of capital equals the marginal cost (Modigliani and Miller, 1958; Tobin, 1969). However 
if their exist frictions in capital markets such as information asymmetries or agency problems, where 
firms are credit constrained, then investment may be suboptimal relative to a no-friction case. 
Furthermore, if objectives are not profit maximising, this condition may not hold.  
From an agency theory perspective, SOEs inefficiency is a natural consequence of separation of 
ownership and control over firm investments and activities (Boubakri et al., 2005; Shleifer and Vishny, 
1997). Firm ownership is by the public but control is centralized to managerial staff whose objectives are 
set by politicians. This may lead managers to (either unilaterally or under instruction) maximise 
objective functions which are not value maximising. Such objective functions could be based on the 
maximisation of employment or wages, providing a range of below cost or non-market provided 
products, choosing politically motivated locations for investments etc. (Chen et al., 2014; Boubakri, 
2015). Managers are also not exposed to the rigours of the market in terms of ensuring an efficient 
allocation of capital which further ensures a disconnect between investment and fundamentals 
(Meggison and Netter, 2001). Within this context, this backdrop provides us with our first testable 
hypothesis: 
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H1: Private firms should demonstrate a positive and significant relationship between fundamentals and 
investment. SOES may have an insignificant relationship or have a lower coefficient size.  
Additionally, recent research finds that centrally controlled SOEs are less likely to be affected by agency 
problems relating to location specific political interference relative to SOEs that are locally controlled 
(Chen et al., 2011). We therefore test whether there are differences across the type of SOE: 
H2: Centrally controlled SOEs should be more efficient than locally controlled SOEs.  
One clear finding of the literature on investment efficiency and state-owned enterprises is that following 
privatization or majority equitization, enterprises display considerably improved efficiency (Guedhami et 
al, 2009; Meggison et al., 1994; Boubakri and Cosset, 1998) as well as improved governance, financial 
reporting and financial transparency (Borisova et al, 2012; Bushman et al., 2004; Guedhami et al., 2004). 
Research also finds improvements in profitability and productivity following the divestment (Shleifer, 
1998; La Porta and Lopez de Silanes, 1999; Ramamurti, 1997; Djankov and Pohl, 1997; Claessens and 
Djankov, 1999). Our data allow us to test these hypothesis as we observe the same firm transitioning 
from fully state owned to privatised as well as partial or minority equitization. We can therefore pose 
the following hypothesis: 
H3: Investment efficiency improvements following state divestment will depend on the degree of 
privatisation.  
Our data facilitate a split by size and sector that is more granular than the existing literature. We 
therefore can test a range of further hypotheses which use the granularity in our sample. We distinguish 
between strategic sectors (mining, steel, transportation, communications and utilities) relative to other 
sectors. As strategic sectors are under strict regulatory control and in many cases are used to provide 
public goods from a natural or quasi-natural monopoly position, their investment efficiency is potentially 
lower than other industries as they are more likely to follow political objective functions relative to 
enterprises in non-strategic sectors. The impacts of privatisation is also likely to be different from other 
sectors. If regulation continues in these industries, the divergency of objectives between regulators and 
owners can lead managers to inefficient outcomes (Boubakri et al. 2009). Additionally, they can be 
social-service providers, thus the process of privatisation is frought with popular discontent, potential 
social disquiet and conflicting politicial objectives (Boubakri et al. (2009)). Additionally, as fixed capital 
inputs are required differently for different sectors the impacts of privatisation on capital investment 
efficiency is suspected to be different. This leads us to pose the following hypothesis: 
H4: Investment efficiency differs across ownership for strategic and non-strategic sectors.  
Furthermore, larger firms may be more likely to suffer from agency problems given the number of layers 
and opportunities for managers to rent seek or build empires. However, large firms may be less affected 
by information asymmetries in accessing external capital. In this respect, we can expect differences in 
investment efficiency across firm size and ownership type:  
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H5: There are differences in investment efficiency across ownership types between large enterprises and 
SMEs.  
The final hypothesis that we evaluate relates to state-owned enterprises and financing constraints. A 
range of studies have highlighted the fact that soft budget constraints can lead to over investment and 
poor capital efficiency for SOEs (Berglof and Roland, 1998; Hersch et al, 1997; Meggison and Netter, 
2001; Schaffer, 1998).  That is not to say that privatisation or equitization completely dilute the effects 
of soft budget constraints on investment decisions. Political connections can remain for many of these 
firms which may allow them to continue to access cheaper credit. Indeed, Boubakri et al. (2012) show 
that political connections reduce the cost of equity for enterprises. Given this backdrop, it is pertinent to 
investigate the interaction between financing constraints, firm ownership and investment efficiency. We 
therefore pose the following hypothesis: 
H6: The degree of soft budget constraints should impact investment efficiency. Credit constrained 
enterprises should have a greater sensitivity of investment to fundamentals. 
The final part of this hypothesis is motivated by the fact that for credit constrained enterprises, as they 
have positive NPV investments that require capital, they will have a higher marginal value product of 
capital in general. Therefore it should be expected that increases in fundamentals mean a greater 
response in investment for these groups as they are currently operating with below optimal capitals 
stock levels.  
2. Empirical approach and econometric considerations 
A range of previous studies testing investment efficiency focus on the firm’s investment sensitivity to 
variance in its stock price and highlight the role played by asymmetric information and agency problems 
in determining this sensitivity (Chen et al., 2007; Jiang et al., 2011; Foucault and Fresard, 2012). Building 
on these papers, to test the efficiency of capital allocation in Viet Nam, we use the Q model of finance 
(Tobin, 1969)1. In this framework we test whether the link between fundamentals and investment 
differs by firm ownership. This approach has been used in the context of China by Chen et al. (2011) and 
a broader sample of privatised firms by Chen et al. (2014) and is well established in the international 
finance literature (Hennessy, Levy, Whited, 2007; Bond and Soderbom, 2013). The Q model is derived 
from the value maximisation problem of the firm and the Q statistic captures the shadow benefit of 
investment to the firm i.e. the extra benefit the firm gets in terms of profitability of an additional unit of 
capital. With perfect capital markets, no other variable other than the marginal Q is expected to affect 
investment. In this simple investment framework, the relationship between Q and firm investment 
growth is expected to be positive i.e. the higher the potential return of additional units of capital, the 
greater the investment rate.  
In an empirical setting, by testing how sensitive investment spending is to the marginal product value of 
capital, an evaluation can be made as to how closely investment plans are informed by the underlying 
                                                          
1 For an overview of this model and related literature, please see Erickson and Whited (2000) or O’Toole el al. 
(2013).  
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profitability of the enterprise; a larger coefficient on the Q statistic indicates a greater responsiveness of 
investment to fundamentals and thus greater efficiency in capital allocation.    
Our baseline investment model is provided in the following empirical equation:  
𝐼
𝐾𝑖𝑡
=  𝛼0 + 𝛽𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑡 + 𝜽𝑿𝒊𝒕−𝟏 + 𝜸𝒁𝒋𝒕 +   𝜏𝑡 + 𝜇𝑗 + 𝜙𝑟+𝜀𝑖𝑡       (1) 
Where I/Kit is the investment rate of capital stock, 𝑄𝑖𝑡 is an empirical estimate of Tobin’s Q. The key 
coefficient in our estimation strategy is 𝛽𝑄 . We expect that this will be lower for SOEs relative to private 
firms. In all specifications, we include time fixed effects (𝜏), sector fixed effects 𝜇𝑗  and region fixed 
effects 𝜙𝑟. This will purge our estimation of many of the confounding factors at these levels. We include 
a range of controls at the firm level in the vector 𝑿𝒊𝒕−𝟏. This includes firm leverage (total debt to total 
assets), trade credit access (receivables to total assets)2, and firm size (dummy for enterprises less than 
250 employees to capital SMEs). The vector Z captures time varying sector controls including the 
Herfindahl Hershman Index (HHI)3 to measure industry competition and the share of SOEs in the sectors 
output (SMS) to control for the fact that state dominated sectors may have different investment rates 
over time due to policy orientation or direction of investments. A listing of the sectors used in the 
analysis is presented in table A1.  
A difficulty remains in developing an empirical proxy for the unobservable marginal Q. Hayashi (1982) 
outlines the conditions under which average Q is a suitable proxy for marginal Q and this allows the 
estimation of the statistic from observable information. The most well known measure of Q is the ratio 
of the market value of equity and bonds to the book value of the firm (Erikson and Whited, 2006). In the 
context of our research this metric is not applicable as our interest is in SMEs, the majority of whom do 
not have financial market listings.  
We therefore use an alternative methodology outlined by Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1995) and used 
empirically by Ryan et al. (2014), O’Toole et al. (2014), Bierlen and Featherstone (1998) and Benjamin 
and Phimister (2002). This method uses a vector autoregression (VAR) on firm performance indicators to 
estimate a “fundamental Q” which can be used as a proxy for the Q statistic for firms without bond or 
market listings. This methodology does not draw Tobin’s Q from market data but instead uses an 
alternative which is based on proxies for the marginal value product of capital. It has previously been 
used for Viet Nam by O’Toole and Newman (2012). The VAR is as follows:  
𝐕𝐢𝐭 = 𝐇𝐕𝐢𝐭−𝟏 + εit                    (2) 
Qit = (𝐜
′[I − δ𝐇])𝐕𝐢𝐭                    (3) 
Where the vector 𝐕𝐢𝐭 contains proxies for the marginal product value of capital and the error term is a 
composite as in εit = ci + θj   + μr  + τt + ϵit. This errors structure requires the VAR to be estimated 
once the data has been purged of firm-specific time invariant factors, year-fixed effects, region fixed 
                                                          
2 Trade credit financing is shown to be an important source of credit for Vietnamese enterprises (McMillan and 
Woodruff, 2004).  
3 This is measured as the sum of the squares of the firms market shares per sector as standard.  
9 
 
effects, and sector fixed effects. The proxies for the marginal value product of capital used in our 
analysis are both the sales to capital and the profits to capital ratio. c is a vector which identifies the 
main mvpk proxy. We chose the sales to capital ratio as this indicator so as to avoid issues relating to 
loss management through depreciation or other allowances that might occur and affect the profits to 
capital indicator. The discount rate δ is set by the econometrician.4 The coefficient vector H is taken 
from the VAR. The VAR system is estimated using the method outlined by Holtz-Eakin et al. (1988) and 
applied empirically by Love and Zicchino (2007). Orthogonal deviations are used to remove firm-fixed 
effects while year, sector, and ownership fixed effects are also removed. 
Once the empirical proxy for Q is developed, it can be included in the investment equation. As with all Q 
proxies, as it is an estimate of the underlying, unobservable Q, it is measured with error. This 
measurement error must be treated. We therefore estimate the investment equation (1) using GMM 
with lagged values of the marginal value product of capital variables as instruments for Q. This ensures 
that both measurement error is dealt with, as well as controlling for any endogeneity between 
investment, Q and the control variables. Additionally, using GMM with instrumental variables cleanses 
potential omitted variable bias that may occur in our model.  
Identification strategy and subsample selection 
We outline a range of hypotheses in section 2 which provide us a strategy to achieve identification. To 
identify our main effects we will estimate equation (1) for a range of subsamples. Using a subsample 
approach is possible with our dataset which has a large number of observations for all groups of focus. 
In this case, our approach is superior to using interactions as it allows all variables to react differently 
and take different parameter values for each subsample. This reduces the error that an interaction 
between a single variable and a group dummy could be picking up the variation belonging to the group-
specific difference or differences in group specific effects related to the other covariates.  
In our analytical framework, some such subsamples fall naturally out of the data. For example, testing 
hypotheses 1 and 2 can be conducted by simply creating different subsamples from the ownership data 
for private, SOE, and local- and centrally-owned SOEs. Testing effects by size class is conducted by 
splitting the sample into large firms (> 250 employees) and SMEs (less than 250 employes). Sectoral 
splits are either strategic (mining, quarrying, metals, utilities, transport and communications) and non-
strategic sectors (rest).  
A greater difficulty arises to estimate the impact on credit constrained enterprises. In our dataset, we do 
not have the range of variables that allows us to estimate a Whited and Wu (2006) index, nor do we 
have sufficient information to include cash flow and test investment-cash flow sensitivities which would 
be standard in the literature (Bond and Soderbom, 2014). We therefore use a type of Rajan and Zingales 
(1996) logic to identify groups of enterprises that are potentially credit constrained. We use data on the 
debt-to-asset ratio and the debt-to-equity ratio and split firms into percentiles based on these indicators 
on a sector-year basis. We then define as potentially constrained enterprises that are in lowest 25 per 
                                                          
4 In line with Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1995) we use a discount rate of 0.8. Sensitivity analysis of values ranging 
from 0.6 to 0.9 have been conducted and the main results hold in all cases.  
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cent of each distribution. As firms in similar sectors should have a common latent requirement for 
external financing as per Rajan and Zingales (2003), firms who have the lowest use of volume of debt 
financing per sector are those that potentially have access to financing problems. While this may 
capture some firms who have a preference for internal financing and against debt funding, in the main, 
it is likely our measure captures the credit constrained enterprises per sector at each point in time. 
Using these indicators, we split the sample into two groups per variable (constrained and unconstrained) 
and estimate the model separately for both to test whether ownership affects the relationship between 
investment and Q differently for constrained and unconstrained firms.  
Given the fact that we do not observe actual financing constraints, we use a second methodology to 
attempt to dichotomise the sample into constrained and unconstrained. There is a large literature which 
indicates that location choice matters for corporate performance (Almazan, Motta, Titman and Uysal. 
2010; El Ghoul, Guedhami, Pittman and Saadi 2013). Additionally, there is also a large literature which 
indicates that location also matters for investment efficiency as the degree of access to finance to a 
broad range of financing types or general financial development should facilitate more ease of 
undertaking investments (Love, 2003). Given the differences in financial development across regions in 
Viet Nam and its impact on financing constraints (O’Toole and Newman, 2012), we split regions up into 
those with a stock market and those without a stock market. Firms in regions with a stock market should 
be less financially constrained that those without a stock market and therefore should have better 
access to a range of financial services. We then estimate our Q model on the two subsamples of regions. 
In Viet Nam, our split is between the Mekong Delta and Red River Delta regions which contain the Ho 
Chi Min and Ha Noi stock markets and all other regions.   
For our final tests, we wish to evaluate the effects of equitization and privatisation of SOEs on 
investment efficiency. For this assessment, we first remove private firms from the sample and identify 
the difference between current fully-owned SOEs and SOEs who received full or partial divestment using 
interaction terms between ownership categories and the Q statistic as:  
 
𝐼
𝐾𝑖𝑡
=  𝛼0 + 𝛽𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑡 + 𝜽𝑿𝒊𝒕−𝟏 +  𝜷𝑶𝑾𝑵𝒊 + 𝝈𝑄𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑶𝑾𝑵𝒊 +    𝜸𝒁𝒋𝒕 +  𝜖𝑖𝑡     (4) 
Where OWN is vector of dummies which splits SOEs into 1) fully state-owned enterprises (both centrally 
and locally owned firms) or equitized enterprises in which the firm did not have any change in 
ownership during our sample period, 2) SOEs who have been equitized but the state retains a controlling 
shareholding (> 50 per cent of equity) 3) equitized firms in which the state retains a minority 
shareholding (< 50 per cent of equity) 4) firms who have been equitized and then fully privatised and 5) 
firms who were fully privatized immediately. 𝝈  is a vector of coefficients on the interaction term i.e 
[𝜎1, … , 𝜎5] . These coefficients capture the differences in Q from the base category identified by 𝛽𝑄. The 
error structure including the fixed effects is as in equation (1). X and Z controls are also included as per 
equation (1). This allows us to identify hypothesis 3 (H3). To further explore the heterogeneity across 
groups of firms, we undertake these tests across size and sector subsamples as mentioned above. As the 
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research indicates that SOEs often overinvest following political objectives, we also split our sample into 
those enterprises who over and under invest relative to fundamentals as per Biddle et al. (2009).5   
3. Data and summary statistics 
Sample description 
For our research, the data are taken from the Vietnamese Enterprise Survey which is conducted 
annually by the General Statistics Office of Vietnam. It is a national survey compiled across all 64 
provinces and is used as part of their National Accounts determination. The survey takes a census of 
firms with over 30 employees and a representative sample of firms under 30 employees. It has rich data 
coverage and asks firms to compile information on ownership, employment, profitability, output, 
investment, capital stocks, assets, liabilities. Given that the data also cover non-listed firms and in 
particular micro-, small- and medium-sized firms, this is of particular interest and provides a 
contribution of this paper to this literature.  
All sectors of the economy are surveyed which again facilitates a broad review. However, to 
appropriately compare profit oriented private firms to SOEs with alternative objective functions, we 
limited the sectors included in the analysis. As is standard practice, we excluded firms in financial 
intermediation and insurance, education and social work, social, sports and entertainment activities and 
not-for-profit activities. These assumptions are important as they provide us with a test of the effect of 
ownership on enterprise activities in sectors that are traditionally profit-oriented and whose investment 
could be expected to follow neoclassical determinants.  
For the sample used in our analysis, we apply a number of standard cleaning techniques. We remove 
outlier observations that are in the 1 per cent tails of the distribution of each of the continuous 
variables. As we are applying a GMM model and require lags as instruments, we remove firms that do 
not have at least five consecutive observations. This restriction is required to facilitate using deeper lags 
as instruments if higher-order autocorrelation is evident. Our sample period runs from 2001 to 2012 
which provides a long-panel element.  All value variables are deflated using annual GDP deflators 
produced by the General Statistics Office of Viet Nam.   
Our estimation sample is described in table 1. Our data cover 23,120 observations with 15,990 
observations for private and 7,130 observations for SOEs. Splitting the data by size categories and high-
level sectors, it becomes evident that the majority of observations and firms are SMEs and in the non-
strategic industries sector. Having a representative dataset which facilitates our analysis for both SMEs 
and large firms is an important contribution of our research.   In column 1 of Table 1, we break down all 
                                                          
5 The Biddle  et al. (2009) methodology splits the sample into those who under and over investment by estimating 
an investment equation as the sector level controlling for industry sales growth and a dummy for whether or not 
industry sales are growing. The predicted values from this regression are then mapped to the firm level regression 
and a firm indicated as overinvesting (underinvesting) in each year if its investment level is greater (less than) the 
predicted fundamental level.  
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firms by the ownership type.6 In total 69 per cent of our observations relate to private firms while 31 per 
cent relate to SOEs.  Private enterprises dominate the SME sample with over 77 per cent of SMEs 
private. Unsurprisingly, SOEs have a higher share of large firms (61 per cent) relative to private firms.  
For the purposes of this analysis, we break sectors down into strategic and non-strategic sectors. 
Strategic sectors are those in which it is expect the state would be more likely to maintain its presence 
through SOE ownership. We define strategic sectors as enterprises operating in mining, metals, 
transport, communications and utilities. More detail of the sectoral mapping is provided in table A1.7 
Private firms dominate the non-strategic sectors while the split of strategic between private and SOE is 
even (roughly 50 per cent each).  
Table 1: Breakdown of Observations by Ownership Type, Size and Sector  
  All SME Large 
Non-
Strategic 
Sector 
Strategic 
Sector 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Private 15,990 14,048 1,912 15,108 882 
% of column total 69% 77% 39% 71% 51% 
SOE 7,130 4,127 2,986 6,268 862 
% of column total 31% 23% 61% 29% 49% 
Always Private 11,997 10,543 1,428 11,293 704 
% of column total 52% 58% 29% 53% 40% 
Always SOE 5,488 3,199 2,278 4,743 745 
% of column total 24% 18% 47% 22% 43% 
Equitized  (SOE Share > 50%) 904 498 403 819 85 
% of column total 4% 3% 8% 4% 5% 
Equitized (SOE Share <  50%) 738 430 305 706 32 
% of column total 3% 2% 6% 3% 2% 
Privatised from Equitized 1,067 828 237 986 81 
% of column total 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 
Privatised from SOE 2,926 2,677 247 2,829 97 
% of column total 13% 15% 5% 13% 6% 
Total 23,120 18,175 4,898 21,376 1,744 
       
A main contribution of this paper is to test the effect on investment efficiency of changes in ownership 
of SOEs, through privatisations and equitizations. In our data, we are able to classify state-owned 
                                                          
6 Note that the first representation of private includes observations for firms that were always private or those 
that were equitized or privatised with majority private ownership. The categories following disentangle whether 
the ownership was always private or a firm undergoing ownership change.  
7 Industries in our data are classified as per the Vietnamese Standard Industry Classification which is the official 
classification used in Viet Nam as dictated by the Ministry of Planning and Investment. 
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enterprises into five categories: 1) fully state-owned enterprises (both centrally and locally owned firms) 
or equitized enterprises in which the firm did not have any change in ownership during our sample 
period, 2) SOEs who have been equitized but the state retains a controlling shareholding (> 50 per cent 
of equity) 3) equitized firms in which the state retains a minority shareholding (< 50 per cent of equity) 
4) firms who have been equitized and then fully privatised and 5) firms who were fully privatized 
immediately in our data. By grouping firms into these categories, we can identify the impact of changes 
to efficiency within firm which is a more powerful finding than simply comparing across groups of 
enterprises.   
Table 1 presents the data on the number of observations in our sample for the SOEs and former SOEs 
who changed ownership overall and by firm size and sector.8 In total, over 50 per cent of the SOEs in the 
data underwent some ownership change. The most frequent mode of ownership transfer was through 
direct privatisation. Just over 13 per cent of the observations in our data relate to enterprises who 
transferred to full, direct privatization from state ownership. Nearly 5 per cent of the observations relate 
to firms who were previously equitized but then became fully privatized.  A further 4 per cent of firms 
were partially equitized but the state retained a majority shareholding and 3 per cent were equitized 
with the state holding a minority stake.  
Table 1 also presents the distribution of the observations by enterprise size and main sector of 
operation. The degree of privatization and equitization has been greater for SMEs than for large firms. 
This is unsurprising as many of the large firms owned by the Vietnamese state are in strategic sectors 
whereas many of the SMEs may be more likely a legacy issue from the command economy era. For large 
firms, the most frequently observed transition is to partial but controlling equitization whereas for 
SMEs, the majority of firms who transition have been privatized completely.  
While not displayed in table 1, in terms of the geographic distribution of the data, 40 per cent of the 
observations are based in the Red River Delta region which contains the capital Ha Noi. Circa 33 per cent 
of observations are in the South East region, which contains Ho Chi Minh City. Other regions represent 
an additional 24 per cent of the data.  
Summary statistics 
Table 2 presents the mean values for the key variables used in our analysis. The average investment rate 
is 24% for all firms. It is higher for private firms than SOEs at 27% and 17% respectively. Table 3 presents 
a simple t-test of whether these mean differences are significant and we reject H0 of equivalence at the 
1 per cent level.  
The sales to capital ratio is high overall and is again higher for private firms that SOEs. Given the labour 
intensive nature of many activities in Vietnam it is unsurprising that high levels of output per unit of 
capital are evident. Private firms also appear to earn additional sales per unit capital relative to SOEs. 
                                                          
8 Please note that the number of firms and observations from this data do not correspond to the tables above as in 
this data on the ownership change, a particular firm can shift category and therefore will be double counted. 
Identifying these firms who change is a key element in our identification strategy. In table 1, the firms and 
observations are discrete categories.  
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This may be indicative of poor investments, which we test formally in the next section. The difference 
between the sales to capital ratios for state firms and for private firms is statistically significant at the 1 
per cent level (Table 2).  
Turning to profitability, the ratio of profits to capital is 0.56 overall, 0.53 for private firms and 0.62 for 
SOEs. While not presented in the table, our data on the profit to asset ratio suggests a return on assets 
of approximately 5 per cent overall, with 5 per cent for private and 6 per cent for SOEs. Both of these 
variables appear to indicate higher profitability for SOEs than private firms. This is unsurprising in that 
many of the SOEs are active in protected and highly concentrated sectors. This ensures they can earn 
monopoly or oligopoly rents. This suggests that it is important to control for market competition in our 
formal econometric testing. Again comparing the means in Table 2, the differences are statistically 
significant. For Q, as a linear combination of the sales to capital and profits to capital, its mean follows a 
similar pattern. It is higher for private firms than for SOEs. Leverage, measured as total outstanding 
liabilities, stands at approximately 50 per cent of total assets. SOEs have slightly higher levels of leverage 
than private firms. This may represent legacy issues or alternatively better access to credit from state-
owned financial institutions. Receivables to total assets are 0.23 and are higher for SOEs than private 
firms.  
Table 2 also presents the mean values for the main variables for the privatisation and equitization 
analysis. The data are split out for all firms. We observe the investment rates are highest for privatized 
firms and lowest for firms with partial equitization. For equitized firms the profits to capital ratio is 
higher than full SOEs as well as for privatized firms. However, market structure and the ability to capture 
rents must be controlled for in a comparison of marginal products. The sales to capital ratio and Q are 
higher for privatized firms relative to all other groups.  
 Table 2: Mean Values for Key Variables 
 
Overall Private SOE 
Difference (Priv to 
SOE) 
I/K 0.24 0.27 0.17 0.10 *** 
S/K 24.54 27.79 16.60 11.19 *** 
Profits/K  0.56 0.53 0.62 -0.09 *** 
Q 30.98 35.06 21.03 14.03 *** 
Leverage  0.50 0.49 0.53 -0.036 *** 
Receivables 0.23 0.22 0.27 -0.05 *** 
SME 0.80 0.89 0.58 0.31 *** 
 
Equitized  (SOE 
Share > 50%) 
Equitized (SOE 
Share <  50%) 
Privatised from 
Equitized 
Privatised from 
SOE 
I/K 0.12 0.12 0.25 0.23 
S/K 14.55 14.5 18.29 35.05 
Profits/K 0.71 0.67 0.58 0.46 
Q 18.48 18.4 23.14 44.15 
 Source: Authors calculations using VES data. *** indicate significant at the 1 per cent level, 
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HHI and the state market power variable capture time-varying sector controls. The sectoral breakdown 
is presented in table A1 in Appendix A. The most concentrated industry, is as expected, mining and 
utilities.  Focusing on the market presence of SOEs, the average share of SOEs in sectoral output is 17 
per cent. 
Exploring correlations 
Table 3 presents the correlation coefficients for the main variables used in our assessment of the 
ownership effects of efficiency. The correlation coefficients are estimated firstly for private firms and 
SOEs then for each of the ownership groupings. Focusing on the correlation coefficients between 
investment and Q, the coefficients with the generated Q statistic is 0.18 for private firms. For SOEs, the 
correlation is slightly lower at 0.17. This would indicate that a slightly lower correlation between 
investment and our proxy for the return on an additional unit of capital (marginal benefit of capital) is 
evident for SOEs relative to private firms. Formally testing these relationships in a causal manner is the 
main aim of our econometric section.  
Finally focusing on the correlation between investment and the financial measures (leverage and trade 
receivables), we find a higher correlation of investment to leverage for private firms relative to SOEs. 
This may reflect the softer budget constraints and easier access to finance for SOEs who operate with an 
implicit or explicit government guarantee on liabilities and government financing of deficits or 
investment.  
Table 3 also presents the correlation coefficients between investment and the main variables for each of 
the ownership groupings. In regard to the correlation between Q and investment, it is interesting to 
note that the highest correlation overall is for the group of firms that were privatized from equitization. 
The second highest correlation between Q and investment is for enterprises equitized to a minority 
holding. With the direct privatization, and enterprises that were equitized with a remaining government 
majority stake display a lower correlation between investment and Q.  
There is considerable variance in the correlation coefficients between investment and the leverage and 
trade credit indicators across the ownership changes. The highest correlation between leverage and 
investment is for firms who were privatised fully from SOEs. Enterprises equitized to a minority holding 
actually display a negative correlation between leverage and investment. If these firms were attempting 
to re-build balance sheets and reduce debt overhangs, this negative relationship is plausible.     
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Table3: Correlation Coefficients for Main Variables by Ownership Types 
Private Firms 
 
I/K Q Leverage Receivables/TA 
I/K 1 
   Q 0.18 1 
  Leverage 0.04 0.02 1 
 Receivables/TA 0.04 0.09 0.17 1 
SOEs 
I/K 1 
   Q 0.17 1 
  Leverage 0.03 0.10 1 
 Receivables/TA 0.00 0.18 0.32 1 
Equitized  (SOE Share > 50%) 
I/K 1 
   Q 0.13 1 
  Leverage 0.03 0.06 1 
 Receivables/TA 0.06 0.24 0.23 1 
Equitized (SOE Share <  50%) 
I/K 1 
   Q 0.19 1 
  Leverage -0.04 0.07 1 
 Receivables/TA 0.01 0.12 0.13 1 
Privatised from Equitized 
I/K 1 
   Q 0.21 1 
  Leverage 0.03 0.02 1 
 Receivables/TA 0.05 0.20 0.20 1 
Privatised from SOE 
I/K 1 
   Q 0.13 1 
  Leverage 0.07 -0.0176 1 
 Receivables/TA 0.04 -0.03 0.28 1 
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4.       Empirical results 
This section presents the results of our main estimations. We firstly test the relationship between 
investment and the Q statistic by ownership. Second, we explore whether there are differences in these 
relationships for different firms across size and industry. Thirdly we test the impact relationship 
between investment and Q for firms who are financially constrained.  Finally we evaluate whether the 
effects of privatization and equitization alter the relationship between the Q statistic and investment.   
Investment, fundamental Q and ownership 
In this section, we test the relationship between Q and investment by ownership. Our estimation 
strategy uses a GMM model with instruments to deal with measurement error in Q and potential 
omitted variable bias. Instruments are again taken from lags dated t-4 and t-5. All controls as per 
equation (1) are included in the models.  
Table 4 presents the coefficients estimates for the Q model for all firms (column (1)), for private firms 
(column (2)), for SOEs (column (3)). Our estimates indicate a positive coefficient on the Q statistic for all 
firms that is statistically significant at the 1 per cent level. In column (2), there is no significant 
relationship between Q and investment for the SOEs while the relationship for the private firms is 
positive and significant at the 5 per cent level. Our estimated model does not identify a relationship 
between fundamentals and investment as indicated by the Q statistic for SOEs. This suggests that 
investment activities, investment strategies and plans are not driven solely by profitability concerns as 
measured by the marginal product of capital for SOEs. Our evidence does indicate that private firms 
evaluate investment in terms of its marginal benefit. Our findings are in line with the literature which 
suggests that SOEs objective functions are not purely profit maximizing, focusing instead on social policy 
or political objectives.  In this regard our findings support the first hypothesis proposed (H1) which 
indicates that Q should be positive for private firms but either insignificant or of lower value for SOEs.  
We further split the SOE group into those firms who are centrally controlled (column (4)) and locally 
controlled SOEs (column (5)). This test corresponds to H2 which posits that centrally controlled SOEs 
should be more efficient (Chen et al., 2011). We do not find evidence of this: the results do not indicate 
any significant relationship between Q and investment for either centrally or locally controlled SOEs. In 
our setting it would appear that the agency difficulties that plague SOEs are equally prevalent between 
local and centrally operated enterprises.  
In terms of control variables, the coefficient on leverage is negative and significant for private firms. This 
may indicate that debt overhang is acting as a drag on the investment of private firms in Viet Nam. If 
outstanding credit balances are constraining current investment, this may restrict their future growth 
opportunities. We do not find any effect of trade receivables on investment for state owned enterprises 
with some effect for private firms at the 10 per cent level.  
Table 4: GMM Estimates of Fundamental Q Model  
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All Firms Private Firms SOEs SOE (Central) SOE (Local) 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Q 0.002*** 0.002** 0.002 -0.001 0.002 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) 
Leverage t-1 -0.140 -0.326* 0.065 -0.284 0.254 
 
(0.129) (0.187) (0.144) (0.223) (0.243) 
Receivables/TA t-1 0.779** 0.987* -0.019 0.832 0.325 
 
(0.383) (0.505) (0.552) (0.516) (0.472) 
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y 
Sector FE Y Y Y Y Y 
Region FE Y Y Y Y Y 
Sector-Time Controls Y Y Y Y Y 
N 23,419 15,245 8,174 1,853 3,254 
AR(1) Test 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
AR(2) Test 0.032 0.017 0.407 0.939 0.136 
Sargan Test 0.042 0.255 0.832 1.000 1.000 
Instruments 122 122 121 109 116 
Notes: Model estimated using GMM with lagged values of all variables dated t-4 and t-5 as instruments. Standard 
errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered at the firm level. Year dummies also included in all 
regressions.  
 
 
To provide some insight into the economic magnitude of the estimated coefficients, we test the impact 
of a single standard deviation shock to Q on investment and provide a simple interpretation as per 
McClean et al. (2012). The standard deviation of Q in the private sample is 99.11. As the coefficient is 
0.002, a one standard deviation shock to Q leads to a 0.198 unit increase in investment. As the mean 
investment in the sample is 0.38, this implies an investment increase of 50 per cent.  
Our main finding from table 13 suggests that SOEs do not set investment plans based on the marginal 
product of capital regardless of whether these firms are locally or centrally controlled SOEs.  Private 
firms are guided by such considerations. This finding is in line with the extant literature (Chen et al., 
2011; Chen et al, 2014).  
Exploring differences across size and sector 
To better explore the heterogeneity of the effects across firms in Viet Nam, we present the results 
separately for firm size and sector in table 5. The model is estimated separately for SOEs and private 
firms across large firms, SMEs, firms in strategic and non-strategic sectors.   Focusing on the sectoral 
breakdown in columns (1)-(4), we find a positive effect for enterprises in the private sector in both 
strategic and non-strategic sectors with the coefficient significant at the 5 per cent level. The coefficient 
size is larger in the strategic sector relative to the non-strategic sector. If competition is stronger in the 
non-strategic sector, this may drive down returns and make firms more uncertain about committing 
capital. Therefore their responsiveness to improving fundamentals is lower. We do not find any 
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evidence of a statistically significant effect of Q on investment for SOEs in either sectoral grouping. This 
is in line with our previous finding for the sample as a whole.  
On firm size, we find a positive and significant impact of Q on investment for private large firms and for 
SMEs. There is no statistically significant relationship between Q and investment for SOEs in either size 
class. The coefficient for large firms is higher than that for small firms indicating a greater 
responsiveness of investment to fundamentals. This may be due to the fact that large firms have better 
access to internal capital and can react more quickly when opportunities arise. It may also be the case 
that their scale provides large firms with a buffer to withstand investment uncertainties and allows them 
to commit to projects more quickly than their SME counterparts. SMEs may react with more restraint 
and be more influenced by uncertain market developments.  
We find a negative effect of leverage on private investment in the non-strategic sector and for SOEs in 
the strategic sectors. This suggests the influence of debt overhang on investment acts as a drag for these 
groupings. For both private and SOE owned SMEs, we find a similar negative effect of leverage on 
investment. The effect of trade credit receivables on investment is positive and significant non-strategic 
sector enterprises and all SMEs.   
Table 5: Investment Determinants by Sector and Firm Size: Cross Ownership Comparisons 
  Non-Strategic Sectors Strategic Sectors Large Firms SMEs 
 
Private  SOE Private SOE Private  SOE Private SOE 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Q 0.002** 0.002 0.015** 0.001 0.010** 0.003 0.002** 0.000 
 
(0.001) (0.002) (0.007) (0.004) (0.005) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) 
Leverage t-1 -0.208*** -0.125 -0.078 -0.413*** -0.149 -0.161 -0.168*** -0.271** 
 
(0.056) (0.095) (0.240) (0.149) (0.117) (0.126) (0.060) (0.123) 
Receivables/TA t-1 0.270*** 0.399*** 0.833 0.350 0.438** 0.150 0.279*** 0.482*** 
 
(0.083) (0.127) (0.542) (0.242) (0.191) (0.155) (0.093) (0.177) 
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Sector FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Region FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Sector-Time 
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
N 14,215 7,215 739 838 1,373 2,732 12,889 4,571 
AR(1) Test 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.006 0.007 0.000 0.000 0.000 
AR(2) Test 0.072 0.221 0.298 0.537 0.518 0.804 0.019 0.078 
Sargen Test 0.017 0.612 0.165 0.826 0.387 0.327 0.018 0.058 
Instrument Count 92 91 83 77 91 91 91 91 
Notes: Model estimated using GMM with lagged values of all variables dated t-4 and t-5 as instruments. Standard 
errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered at the firm level. Year dummies also included in all 
regressions. 
         While there are evident differences in the size of the coefficients in the table (large firms and strategic 
industries with larger coefficients relative to non-strategic industries and SMEs), this may be driven by 
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the variation in values across the different samples. To better understand the magnitude of the effects, 
we again estimate the impact of a one standard deviation shock to Q in each subsample on the average 
investment level in the sample. It is important to use the within subsample values of Q and investment 
to calculate the shocks as the coefficients relate to these data only. The results are presented in table 6.    
     Table 6: Impact of Q on Investment for Private Firms: St Dev Shock 
  Strategic Sectors 
Non-Strategic 
Sectors SMEs 
Large 
Firms 
Q Coefficient 0.015 0.002 0.002 0.01 
Q STDEV 69.0 100.6 89.0 30.3 
I Mean 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 
I % Increase 217% 53% 63% 171% 
     
     For firms in strategic sectors, a one standard deviation increase in Q would increase the investment rate 
by 217 per cent above its mean level of 0.5. In the non-strategic sectors case, the corresponding 
increase in investment for a one standard deviation increase in Q is a 53 per cent increase. For SMEs the 
corresponding increase in investment for a standard deviation increase in Q is 63 per cent while the 
value for large firms is approximately 170 per cent. These are large size increases which could be 
expected in a very capital intensive economy going from the mean investment level to the outer tail of 
the distribution.  
Financing constraints and location: do differences exist? 
The existing literature highlights that soft budget constraints are a source of investment inefficiency for 
state-owned enterprises (Berglof and Roland, 1998; Hersch et al, 1997; Meggison and Netter, 2001; 
Schaffer, 1998).  In this section, we explore whether or not differences exist between constrained and 
unconstrained firms in terms of their investment efficiency. As noted in section 3, we do not have survey 
data to identify firms either rejected for credit applications or firms who are discouraged from applying. 
We therefore have to use indirect measures of financing constraints to identify groups of firms that we 
a-priori expect to be financially constrained. We use two methodologies to do this.  
First, we follow a Rajan & Zingales (1998) type of approach and group firms as constrained and 
unconstrained relative to their position in the distribution of debt to equity or debt to total assets within 
each sector-year. We then take the bottom 25 percentile of each distribution and use these as our 
financially constrained proxy group. Second, we compare the investment efficiency of firms located in a 
region with a major stock market to those firms in other regions. The stock market region location is 
proxying for higher levels of financial development and better access to capital for these firms.  
The results of the estimations for the sample splits on the “constrained” and “unconstrained” groups are 
presented in table 7. The regressions are estimated on separate samples for SOEs and private firms 
respectively. Columns (1)-(4) contain the sample splits using the debt-to-equity ratio distributions while 
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columns (5)-(8) are the estimates using the sample splits of data using the debt-to-asset ratio. Across all 
the specifications, we find no statistically significant effect for SOEs across constrained or unconstrained 
groups. The Q statistic is positive and significant for all regressions for private firms. For private firms, 
the size of the coefficient is larger for the constrained versus the unconstrained groups for each of the 
distributions splits.   
The second split of firms across constrained and unconstrained relates to firms who are in a region with 
and without a stock market. The results for these subsamples are presented in columns (9)-(12). We find 
a significant and positive impact of Q on investment for private firms in both groups at the 5 per cent 
significant level. The magnitude of the coefficient is higher for the group in the region without a stock 
market. As we expect these firms to have poorer access to external financing, this finding is in line with 
our findings using the distributional splits of the debt-to-equity and debt-to-asset distributions that 
private enterprises in a-priori credit constrained subsamples in the data show a greater sensitivity 
between Q and investment. Our results are therefore in line with hypothesis 6.  
We also find a significant impact of Q on investment for SOEs in the region without the subsample. As 
this result is only significant at the 10 per cent level, it must be treated with caution. However, it does 
suggest that SOEs in regions outside the main commercial hubs appear to display some link between 
investment and fundamentals.  
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 Table 7: Investment Model Estimates: Test of Efficiency for Constrained and Unconstrained Firms 
 
Unconstrained  
(>25p DE) 
Constrained  
(<25p DE) 
Unconstrained  
(> 25p D/TA) 
Constrained  
(< 25p D/TA) 
Regions without Stock 
Market 
Region with Stock Market 
  Private SOE Private SOE Private SOE Private SOE Private SOE Private SOE 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Q 0.002* 0.004 0.004*** 0.002 0.002* 0.000 0.003*** 0.005 0.004** 0.006* 0.002 ** 0.002 
 
(0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004) (0.001) (0.002) 
Leverage t-1 -0.162*** -0.254** -0.208 -0.143 -0.206*** -0.172* -0.115 -0.295 -0.064 -0.513*** -0.164*** -0.088 
 
(0.059) (0.103) (0.126) (0.19) (0.069) (0.099) (0.096) (0.226) (0.168) (0.163) (0.1) (0.100) 
Receivables/TA t-
1 
0.285*** 0.371** 0.419** 0.471** 0.374*** 0.461*** 0.144 0.268 0.304* 0.276 0.342*** 
0.481*** 
  (0.089) (0.148) (0.197) (0.197) (0.103) (0.138) (0.142) (0.269) (0.167) (0.204) (0.151) (0.151) 
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Sector FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Region FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Sector-Time 
Controls 
Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Y 
N 11,502 5,734 3,743 2,440 10,987 6,303 4,258 1,871 2,293 1,919 12,091 6,013 
AR(1) Test 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
AR(2) Test 0.058 0.711 0.178 0.174 0.043 0.222 0.18 0.472 0.047 0.22 0.282 0.588 
Sargen Test 0.305 0.734 0.152 0.235 0.159 0.85 0.02 0.263 0.95 0.704 0.035 0.874 
Instrument 
Count 
92 91 92 91 92 91 92 91 78 73 
92 
92 
 Notes: Model estimated using GMM with lagged values of all variables dated t-4 and t-5 as instruments. Standard errors are robust to 
heteroskedasticity and clustered at the firm level. Year dummies also included in all regressions. 
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To test the economic magnitude of these findings, table 8 provides the impact of a one standard 
deviation shock to Q on investment for each of the groups with statistically significant findings in the 
above regressions. Firms classified as a-priori credit constrained would increase investment above the 
mean by between 93 and 131 per cent following a positive one standard deviation shock to Q relative 
with the increases for unconstrained firms between 59 and 61 per cent. Similarly for private firms in 
regions without a stock market, investment increases by 82 per cent following an increase in Q of one 
standard deviation shock. The equivalent figure for private firms in provinces with a stock market is 65 
per cent. SOEs in provinces with a stock market would increase investment by 124 per cent following a 
positive one standard deviation shock to Q. It is difficult to benchmark this finding as this is the only case 
in our analysis where Q has a positive relationship with investment for SOEs.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Table 8: Impact of Q on Investment for Private Firms: Constrained/ Unconstrained Firms 
 
Unconstrained 
(<25p DE) 
Constrained 
(<25p DE) 
Unconstrained 
(<25p D/TA) 
Constrained 
(<25p D/TA) 
Province without 
Stock Market 
Province 
with Stock 
Market 
 Private Private Private Private Private SOE  Private 
Q 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0  
Q STDEV 80.1 93.6 87.2 73.9 54.8 41.0 89.9  
I Mean 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.3  
I % Increase 59% 131% 61% 93% 82% 124% 65%  
24 
 
     
Exploring the effects of equitization and privatisation 
The final contribution of this paper is to build on the extant literature on firm performance following 
privatisation. Table 9 presents the results of the Q model estimated on the sample of current and 
former state-owned enterprises. Our main research question in this section is whether or not the 
relationship between the Q statistic and investment changes when SOEs in Viet Nam have been 
privatised or equitized. If that privatization, or equitization improves the performance of the firm, or at 
realigned its objective function towards profit maximisation, we would expect that Q would be positive 
or higher for groups of firms who have undergone such an ownership change.  
We test the effect of Q on investment by interacting Q with indicator variables for the 4 groups of 
ownership change identifiable in our data. These are 1) Equitized  (SOE Share > 50%), 2) Equitized  (SOE 
Share < 50%), 3) Privatised from Equitized and 4) Privatised from SOE. We use interaction effects to 
avoid issues that occur due to the small samples of firms in some of these categories. We also present 
the results by sector, firm size, and whether or not the firm is under or over investing relative to 
investment fundamentals to explore the heterogeneity of ownership changes on investment efficiency 
across the Vietnamese economy. The models are estimated using GMM again with instruments dated t-
4 and t-5. The Sargan test supports instrument validity at standard significance levels. Controls for 
leverage, receivables, HHI and state market power are included in all regressions. Year, sector and 
region dummies are also included.  
In column (1), we test the impact for all firms in this sample. We observe a positive and statistically 
significant effect for enterprises that were equitized to below 50 per cent state ownership and for those 
enterprises who were fully privatised from SOEs. Looking across groups of firms and industries, these 
main findings hold for SMEs and firms in non-strategic sectors. For firms in strategic sectors, we find that 
it is enterprises whose divestment mechanism was either equitization with a majority shareholding or 
firms who were privatised having previously been equitized that display a positive relationship between 
Q and investment. For large firms, minority shareholding equitization and privatisation from previous 
equitization are the divestment routes through which we find a positive and statistically significant 
relationship between Q and investment. There does not appear to be statistically significant differences 
in the relationship between Q and investment across the under investment/over investment groups.  
Table 9: Test of Investment-Q Relationship for Equitized and Privatized Firms with SOEs 
  All 
Non- 
Strategic 
Sector 
Strategic 
Sector 
Large 
Firms SMEs 
Under 
Invest Over Invest 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Q 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.003 -0.000 -0.000 0.003 
 
(0.002) (0.001) (0.004) (0.002) (0.001) (0.000) (0.007) 
Equitized  (SOE Share > 50%) -0.129 -0.244 -0.416*** -0.164 -0.247 0.011 -0.730 
 
(0.155) (0.164) (0.154) (0.234) (0.181) (0.042) (2.601) 
Equitized (SOE Share <  50%) -0.088 -0.238 -0.758** -0.187 0.039 0.025 -5.020 
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(0.241) (0.230) (0.358) (0.264) (0.285) (0.061) (6.006) 
Privatised from Equitized -0.299 -0.211 -0.675** -0.539 -0.175 -0.041 10.724 
 
(0.329) (0.373) (0.320) (0.543) (0.320) (0.058) (11.075) 
Privatised from SOE -0.244 -0.315 -0.131 -0.307 0.064 -0.089 -1.091 
 
(0.243) (0.232) (0.566) (0.330) (0.274) (0.060) (4.669) 
Equitized  (Share > 50%) x Q 0.003 0.004 0.055*** 0.005 0.002 -0.001 -0.249 
 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.013) (0.007) (0.002) (0.001) (0.796) 
Equitized  (Share < 50%)  x Q 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.036 0.019** 0.012** -0.002 -0.184 
 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.022) (0.009) (0.005) (0.001) (0.140) 
Privatised from Equitized  x Q -0.004 -0.003 0.018** 0.030** -0.002 0.002* 0.045 
 
(0.004) (0.003) (0.008) (0.014) (0.003) (0.001) (0.031) 
Privatised from SOE  x Q 0.005** 0.006*** 0.004 0.023 0.007*** 0.000 0.059 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.006) (0.017) (0.001) (0.001) (0.128) 
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Sector FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Region FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Sector-Time Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
N 11,299 10,134 988 3,096 7,157 6,576 146 
AR(1) Test 0.000 0.000 0.005 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.699 
AR(2) Test 0.083 0.086 0.825 0.863 0.009 0.195 0.430 
Sargen Test 0.992 0.991 0.959 0.136 0.996 0.790 0.651 
Instrument Count 278 278 149 252 268 265 40 
Notes: Additional year controls included in all regressions.  Estimates are produced using GMM estimation 
techniques with lagged levels as instruments. Lags are dated t-4, t-5 for all variables. Orthogonal deviations are 
used to remove firm-specific heterogeneity. Sectoral dummies, and regional dummies also included as are firm size 
classes. Controls for leverage, receivables, HHI and State MP also included in the regressions. 
 
In addition to testing the improvement in investment efficiency following privatisation and equitization 
against existing SOEs, it is also of interest to benchmark how these firms stack up against private firms. 
In table 10, we estimate the average Q for private firms, equitized firms with a less than 50 per cent 
state holding and immediately privatised firms. We can see that the value of Q is higher for both 
privatised groupings with fully privatised higher than equitized firms. This result holds across all firms 
and for SMEs. The average effects are not significant for large firm. These former SOEs may find 
restructuring and legacy size issues difficult to deal with. Across sectors, in both manufacturing and 
services privatised firms have a higher average Q than private firms. These findings indicate that 
privatisation, in improving the efficiency of capital allocation, is a successful policy initiative in the 
Vietnamese case.  
Table 10: Test of Investment-Q Relationship for Equitized and Privatized Firms with Privatized Firms 
 
 
    
 
All 
Firms 
Non-Strategic Sectors Strategic Sectors Large Firms SMEs 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
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Equitized  (Share < 50%)   0.010*** 0.010*** 0.035 0.023** 0.011* 
 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.026) (0.010) (0.006) 
Privatised from SOE 0.006*** 0.007*** 0.001 0.028 0.007*** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.005) (0.018) (0.001) 
Private 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.014* 0.012* 0.002** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.007) (0.006) (0.001) 
            
N 23,073 21,095 1,548 4,007 17,167 
Notes: Additional year controls included in all regressions.  Estimates are produced using GMM estimation 
techniques with lagged levels as instruments. Lags are dated t-4, t-5 for all variables. Orthogonal deviations are 
used to remove firm-specific heterogeneity. Sectoral dummies, and regional dummies also included as are firm 
size classes. Controls for leverage, receivables, HHI and State MP also included in the regressions. Also included 
is the average Q effect for privatised from equitized but it is insignificant.  
 
 
Table 11: Impact of Q on Investment for Different Groups of Privatisation 
  Equitized  (Share < 50%) Privatised from SOE Private 
Q 0.01 0.006 0.003 
Q St Dev 31.3 94.5 84.1 
I Change 0.3 0.6 0.3 
I Mean 0.1 0.2 0.3 
I Increase 254% 249% 87% 
    To provide some insight into the economic magnitude of these findings, table 11 provides the impact of 
a one standard deviation shock to Q on investment for each of the groups in table 10. Equitized firms 
with minority remaining state shareholding increase investment by 254 per cent following a one 
standard deviation increase in Q. The equivalent impacts for privatised firms direct from SOE and private 
firms is 249 per cent and 87 per cent.  
These findings indicate that there is considerable heterogeneity across groups of firms and industries in 
the impact of state divestment on investment efficiency. For the majority of firms in non-strategic 
sectors, where the enterprise is an SMEs, the most effective divestment strategy is either a full direct 
privatisation or a equitiziation where only a minority holding remains. These results provide insight on 
the distributional impacts and divestment route which is unexplored to date in the existing literature.  
5. Conclusions and policy implications 
This paper evaluates the efficiency of capital allocation amongst Vietnamese firms. It contributes to the 
literature on corporate governance and capital allocation and the literature on the effects of ownership 
change and efficiency in transition economies. It also provides important insight into the policy reform 
agenda for Viet Nam.  
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Using a structural Q model of finance, we find no significant relationship between Q and investment for 
SOEs and a positive and significant effect for private firms. This also holds for both private firms and 
SMEs as well as across manufacturing, construction and market services sectors.  
Using the structural Q model, we also test the effect of privatisation and equitization policies on the 
investment efficiency of former SOEs. We find that fully privatised former SOEs are equitized SOEs that 
retain only a minority state shareholding have a positive relationship between Q and investment 
suggesting efficiency in capital allocation. We also find that the investment of these categories of firms 
has a stronger link to our Q measure relative to private firms, again reinforcing the positive benefits of 
reform.  
Our findings have a number of important policy implications for Viet Nam in transition. We find no link 
between investment and firm fundamentals for Vietnamese SOEs. This would suggest that a continued 
implementation of reform oriented policies should improve capital allocation in the economy. 
Additionally, the results suggest that the reform agenda to date has had a positive effect on the 
performance of privatised or equitized firms. A continued focus on reforming the SOE sector and 
undertaking managed and balanced privatisation and equitizisation policies can contribute to improved 
investment efficiency. Such reforms can lay the platform for continued Vietnamese growth in the 
medium term.    
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A1: Data Appendix 
Additional summary statistics and description of the data cleaning process.  
Table A1: Sector Means of Time Varying Sector Controls 
Sector HHI (Mean) SOE Market Share 
1. Manufacturing of food, beverages and tobacco  0.7% 37.2% 
2. Manufacturing of leather, textiles, garments  1.0% 27.0% 
3. Manufacturing of chemicals and chemicals  2.7% 38.1% 
4. Manufacturing of wood, paper, and furniture  0.6% 25.0% 
 5. Manufacturing of rubber and plastics  0.9% 23.0% 
 6. Manufacturing of other non-metalic metals 1.6% 47.5% 
7. Manufacturing of basic or fabricated metals  1.4% 23.2% 
8. Manufacturing of machinery, equipment and other n.e.c. 3.4% 22.0% 
9. Other Manufacturing  3.0% 26.6% 
10. Construction and Real Estate  0.5% 53.2% 
11. Wholesale trade  1.1% 47.1% 
 12. Retail trade  1.0% 35.7% 
13. Wholesale and retail motor trade  1.4% 37.3% 
14. Transport, storage and communication  6.1% 66.4% 
15. Other market Services  0.8% 35.4% 
16. Mining and utilities  17.9% 75.6% 
Sectoral breakdown used in analysis: Manufacturing (1-9, 16), Construction (10), Services (11-15)  
Source: VES Sample data 
 
 
